Nigeria

Context analysis

The security context in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) is complex and very fluid as the two Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), continue to conduct operations in large parts of north-eastern Nigeria and as well in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The spiral of violence between the AOGs and local security forces, which lasts since 2009, has triggered massive population displacements (more than one million IDPs), while an estimated figure of over 20,000 people have been killed directly or collaterally. Furthermore, an undetermined number of civilians is being deprived from humanitarian aid in areas deemed to be inaccessible. While JAS has focused on indiscriminate attacks through raids and Person-Born Explosive Devices (PBIEDs), ISWAP has embarked on a deadly offensive against SF positions in northern Borno. Additionally, the latest group was responsible for the abduction and killing of two aid workers. NGOs operating in the LCB face strong challenges in terms of access and security in a context that is expected to grow increasingly adverse.

OPERATIONAL SINCE
2016

INSO FACTS & FIGURES

7
STAFF
43
NGO
MEMBERS
2.4 M
IDPs
(OCHA)

Gross Incident Rate

Jan to Apr 2019

The Gross Incident Rate (GIR) consists of all security incidents recorded and reported by INSO in this country for the stated period with no disaggregation or exclusion. It includes conflict and criminal related incidents; serious (i.e. bombings) and non-serious events (i.e. demonstrations); and both security improving (i.e. arrests/seizures) and security-deteriorating incidents (i.e. attacks). The Gross Incident Rate is valuable in providing a snapshot of the overall level of volatility in the country.  It is not valuable in assessing the specific risk to NGOs and/or whether a situation is becoming better or worse as changes in the GIR may be caused by both positive (more arrests) or negative (more attacks) trends.
Total
Jan to Apr 2019
Total incidents recorded in Nigeria this year to date. Updated monthly.




896
INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Apr 2019
Total incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.



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AUTHOR
Jan to Apr 2019
Percentage of incidents by author* (arrests, government security operations, armed opposition, tribal and criminal activity). Updated monthly.

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NGO INCIDENT Rate

Jan to Apr 2019

The NGO Incident Rate (NIR) comprises a gross count of all incidents that involved an NGO in this country for the stated time period. It includes both criminal and conflict related events; serious (i.e. killings/abductions) and non-serious (i.e. threats, petty robbery) incidents; and occurrences of both direct, indirect and/or accidental/collateral involvement. The NIR is valuable in evaluating NGO general exposure to ambient insecurity in this country and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where the NIR shows no clear pattern over time, specific NGO targeting is assumed not to be present however it is important to remember that rate changes are also affected by per-capita density and NGO mobility. Neither INSO nor any other entity we are aware of has meaningful data on these two components, meaning that numbers should be taken as gross indicators only.  
Total
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO incidents in Nigeria this year to date. Updated monthly.

32
NGO INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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Type
Jan to Apr 2019
Percentage of incidents by type* (SAF, IED, intimidation etc). Updated monthly.


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NGO Fatality Rate

Jan to Apr 2019

The NGO Fatality Rate (NFR) comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been killed or died in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross organisations only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both criminal and conflict related causes; targeted and accidental deaths and all types of weapons/tactics. The NGO Fatality Rate works with the NIR and is valuable in determining the likelihood of this most serious result and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where there is no clear upwards trend in NGO deaths, we assess that systematic targeting of NGOs does not exist and that deaths rather occur as a result of exposure to ambient insecurity albeit with occasional targeted events.
Total
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO fatalities in Nigeria this year to date. Updated monthly.



6
NGO FATALITIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO fatalities per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Apr 2019
Percentage of national and international NGO staff fatalities. Updated monthly.


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NGO Injury Rate

Jan to Apr 2019

The NGO Injury Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been injured in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both accidental and deliberate causes. In the case where an individual subsequently dies from their injuries, they have been removed from this count and added to the NFR.
Total
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO injuries in Nigeria this year to date. Updated monthly.



4
NGO INJURIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO injuries per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Apr 2019
Percentage of national and international NGO staff injuries. Updated monthly.


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NGO Abduction Rate

Jan to Apr 2019

The NGO Abduction Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been abducted in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. For this purpose "abduction" includes all cases of NGO workers being taken against their will and unlawfully for any purpose and for any duration. Some abductions turn in to kidnapping (where political or criminal demands are made) and some in to detentions (where the victim is released without demand). 
Total
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO abductions in Nigeria this year to date. Updated monthly.



1
NGO ABDUCTIONS
PER MONTH
Jan to Apr 2019
Total NGO abductions per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Apr 2019
Percentage of national and international NGO staff abductions. Updated monthly.


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REPORTS SENT
29
ALERTS SENT
50
NGO ROUNDTABLES HOSTED
11
ORIENTATION BRIEFING
2
INSO NGO Service: Jan to Apr 2019

Key Risks & Mitigation Measures

Risk
Collateral exposure to AOG attacks. The ongoing conflict dynamics and the heightened level of AOG activities in north-eastern Nigeria represent a strong challenge for humanitarian actors. The multiplication of AOG attacks against Security Forces or against civilians, notably for predatory motives, as well as the important number of NGOs operating in the area (particularly in Borno) create a heightened risk of collateral exposure to clashes or attacks.
Risk

Kidnapping. While instances of civilian abductions of kidnappings by AOGs are frequently reported in north-eastern Nigeria, specific kidnapping threats against humanitarian workers (for economic or political motives) have been identified, as illustrated by the abduction and recent killing of two aid workers.

Risk

Roadblocks. Violent roadblocks by AOG operatives, criminal elements or for ethno-political motives (clashes between communities, notably herdsmen and farmers) are frequently reported in north-eastern Nigeria.

Mitigation Ensure situational awareness and monitoring (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements. Avoid close proximity with parties to the conflict, notably Security Forces (i.e. armed escorts, collocation in military facilities). NGOs should also ensure staff have followed personal security training and have a medevac plan in place. Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). NGOs should also employ strong community acceptance strategies, make sure compounds are secure, control staff movement, implement low-profile strategies when and where needed (i.e. keep a low profile when in transit, or implement staff profiling strategies in the most at-risk areas).

Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements, keep a low profile when in transit, travel in convoys, use functional and adapted communication equipment.

Risk
Collateral exposure to AOG attacks. The ongoing conflict dynamics and the heightened level of AOG activities in north-eastern Nigeria represent a strong challenge for humanitarian actors. The multiplication of AOG attacks against Security Forces or against civilians, notably for predatory motives, as well as the important number of NGOs operating in the area (particularly in Borno) create a heightened risk of collateral exposure to clashes or attacks.
Mitigation Ensure situational awareness and monitoring (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements. Avoid close proximity with parties to the conflict, notably Security Forces (i.e. armed escorts, collocation in military facilities). NGOs should also ensure staff have followed personal security training and have a medevac plan in place.
Risk

Kidnapping. While instances of civilian abductions of kidnappings by AOGs are frequently reported in north-eastern Nigeria, specific kidnapping threats against humanitarian workers (for economic or political motives) have been identified, as illustrated by the abduction and recent killing of two aid workers.

Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). NGOs should also employ strong community acceptance strategies, make sure compounds are secure, control staff movement, implement low-profile strategies when and where needed (i.e. keep a low profile when in transit, or implement staff profiling strategies in the most at-risk areas).


Risk

Roadblocks. Violent roadblocks by AOG operatives, criminal elements or for ethno-political motives (clashes between communities, notably herdsmen and farmers) are frequently reported in north-eastern Nigeria.

Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements, keep a low profile when in transit, travel in convoys, use functional and adapted communication equipment.