Mali
Context analysis
The Sahel is experiencing a serious security and humanitarian crisis and the situation is particularly volatile in Mali. In early 2012, AOG with different political agendas pushed the Malian forces southwards. Military turmoil resulted in a political coup in Bamako in March 2012, while in the North radical AOG rejected independent/autonomous AOG outside main cities. By January 2013, a French led counter-insurgency operation had caused AOG to abandon their new positions and MINUSMA was established in April 2013. While largely credible July 2013 elections went some way towards easing political tensions, the country faces major challenges in overcoming the rifts of the coup, settling a lasting peace with the separatists and combating a resurgent transnational guerilla force. For the last months, pro-government AOG and autonomous AOG occupied the northern part of the country and continued fighting while engaged in a peace process lead by Algiers, which was finally signed in June 2015.
IBK was elected for a 2nd mandate of 5-year in 2018 after 2-month electoral process disputed by the oppositions, during which NGOs have slow down their activities and not directly impacted by AOG that opposed to the electoral process. Implementation of the peace agreement continue to be a big challenge, as previous attempts in the last 50 years have failed. Its implementation has been delayed during the electoral campaign and extension of 6-months has been granted for agreement’s parties not yet implemented. The DDR plan could create additional tensions due to the little progress on 2018, the challenges of the identification’s criteria of ex-combatants and the cantonment sites not ready.
In the meantime, radical AOG are still present and expand their attacks and presence to all Central Region and recently to the south areas so far spared from the conflict. Despite the increasing of AOG incidents, NGOs were little affected as are not directly targeted. However, the situation has limited the access to same areas that required more efforts to ensure acceptance and access to vulnerable populations.
In this very volatile situation, crime constitutes 50% of the total incidents and 85% of NGO incidents. Motor and carjacking in the axes and burglaries of guesthouses and offices are the most frequents NGO incidents. Level of violence during the attacks is particularly high in Menaka. In this situation, NGOs have difficulty in accessing vulnerable populations, that require to have reliable information about security and context, and to have collective security approach.
2013
INSO FACTS & FIGURES
MEMBERS
People In Need
(OCHA)
95
450
243
11
Key Risks & Mitigation Measures
| Risk Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and moto-carjacking have increased. Level of violence is reason of concerns in some areas. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements. |
Risk Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against militaries). |
Risk Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players. |
| Mitigation Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence. Improve the advocacy work vis à vis the local populations and authorities in order to improve awareness of NGOs work and procedures |
Mitigation Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Avoid overtaking military convoy in order to limit the exposition to IED explosion. Closely monitor and assess local security environments. |
Mitigation NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming. |
| Risk Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and moto-carjacking have increased. Level of violence is reason of concerns in some areas. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements. |
Mitigation Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence. Improve the advocacy work vis à vis the local populations and authorities in order to improve awareness of NGOs work and procedures |
Risk Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against militaries). |
Mitigation Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Avoid overtaking military convoy in order to limit the exposition to IED explosion. Closely monitor and assess local security environments. |
Risk Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players. |
Mitigation NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming. |
