The Sahel is experiencing a serious security and humanitarian crisis and the situation is particularly volatile in Mali. In early 2012, AOG with different political agendas pushed the Malian forces southwards. Military turmoil resulted in a political coup in Bamako in March 2012, while in the North radical AOG rejected independent/autonomous AOG outside main cities. By January 2013, a French led counter-insurgency operation had caused AOG to abandon their new positions and MINUSMA was established in April 2013. While largely credible July 2013 elections went some way towards easing political tensions, the country faces major challenges in overcoming the rifts of the coup, settling a lasting peace with the separatists and combating a resurgent transnational guerilla force. For the last months, pro-government AOG and autonomous AOG occupied the northern part of the country and continued fighting while engaged in a peace process lead by Algiers, which was finally signed in June 2015. Implementation of the peace agreement is now a big challenge, as previous attempts in the last 50 years have failed. In the meantime, radical AOG are still present and expand their attacks southwards to areas so far spared from the conflict. In this very volatile situation, NGOs have difficulty in accessing vulnerable populations and require reliable information about security and context.
Risk Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and carjacking have increased. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements. |
Risk Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and the local security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against MINUSMA). |
Risk Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players. |
Mitigation Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence. |
Mitigation Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Closely monitor and assess local security environments. |
Mitigation NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming. |
Risk Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and carjacking have increased. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements. |
Mitigation Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence. |
Risk Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and the local security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against MINUSMA). |
Mitigation Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Closely monitor and assess local security environments. |
Risk Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players. |
Mitigation NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming. |