Iraq

Context analysis

Iraq continues to struggle with governance and the impact of outside actors. Armed conflict continues but is now driven by an array of factions acting in support of the legal government, such as PMUs, Iraqi Security Forces, and other government institutions. Official or semi-official forces constitute the greats threats and challenges to humanitarian activity by a number of means. These range from highly onerous and fungible access restrictions to detentions and assaults without due process, targeting both beneficiaries and local NGO staff. The focus on IS, perpetuated by the donor governments, the Iraqi Government, and civilians uncomfortable saying otherwise, belies the real structural governance issues that could forestall recovery despite good intensions. OAG activities are not predominantly driven by the Islamic State, but rather occur on a continuum of illegal armed activity that includes criminal groups and likely individuals affiliated with official forces. Taken together, the general lack of authority and diffuse threats presence are highly particular and local in nature, and mean that local approaches to access and exposure can bring significant results for implementation. Going forward, poor governance could breed its own resistance as occurred 2011-14, while cleavages within the state are vulnerable to cooptation by regional actors.

OPERATIONAL SINCE
2014

INSO FACTS & FIGURES

27
STAFF
153
NGO
MEMBERS
8.7 M
People in need
(OCHA)

Gross Incident Rate

Jan to Oct 2018

The Gross Incident Rate (GIR) consists of all security incidents recorded and reported by INSO in this country for the stated period with no disaggregation or exclusion. It includes conflict and criminal related incidents; serious (i.e. bombings) and non-serious events (i.e. demonstrations); and both security improving (i.e. arrests/seizures) and security-deteriorating incidents (i.e. attacks). The Gross Incident Rate is valuable in providing a snapshot of the overall level of volatility in the country.  It is not valuable in assessing the specific risk to NGOs and/or whether a situation is becoming better or worse as changes in the GIR may be caused by both positive (more arrests) or negative (more attacks) trends.
Total
Jan to Oct 2018
Total incidents recorded in Iraq this year to date. Updated monthly.




35387
INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Oct 2018
Total incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.


AUTHOR
Jan to Oct 2018
Percentage of incidents by author* 
(conflict / criminal). Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.


NGO INCIDENT Rate

Jan to Oct 2018

The NGO Incident Rate (NIR) comprises a gross count of all incidents that involved an NGO in this country for the stated time period. It includes both criminal and conflict related events; serious (i.e. killings/abductions) and non-serious (i.e. threats, petty robbery) incidents; and occurrences of both direct, indirect and/or accidental/collateral involvement. The NIR is valuable in evaluating NGO general exposure to ambient insecurity in this country and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where the NIR shows no clear pattern over time, specific NGO targeting is assumed not to be present however it is important to remember that rate changes are also affected by per-capita density and NGO mobility. Neither INSO nor any other entity we are aware of has meaningful data on these two components, meaning that numbers should be taken as gross indicators only.  

Total
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO incidents in Iraq this year to date. Updated monthly.




66
NGO INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.


Type
Jan to Oct 2018
Percentage of incidents by type* (SAF, IED, intimidation etc). Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.


NGO Fatality Rate

Jan to Oct 2018

The NGO Fatality Rate (NFR) comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been killed or died in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross organisations only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both criminal and conflict related causes; targeted and accidental deaths and all types of weapons/tactics. The NGO Fatality Rate works with the NIR and is valuable in determining the likelihood of this most serious result and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where there is no clear upwards trend in NGO deaths, we assess that systematic targeting of NGOs does not exist and that deaths rather occur as a result of exposure to ambient insecurity albeit with occasional targeted events.

Total
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO fatalities in Iraq this year to date. Updated monthly.




2
NGO FATALITIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO fatalities per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.


NATIONALITY
Jan to Oct 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff fatalities. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.

NGO Injury Rate

Jan to Oct 2018

The NGO Injury Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been injured in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both accidental and deliberate causes. In the case where an individual subsequently dies from their injuries, they have been removed from this count and added to the NFR.
Total
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO injuries in Iraq this year to date. Updated monthly.




4
NGO INJURIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO injuries per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.


NATIONALITY
Jan to Oct 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff injuries. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.

NGO Abduction Rate

Jan to Oct 2018

The NGO Abduction Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been abducted in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. For this purpose "abduction" includes all cases of NGO workers being taken against their will and unlawfully for any purpose and for any duration. Some abductions turn in to kidnapping (where political or criminal demands are made) and some in to detentions (where the victim is released without demand).
Total
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO abductions in Iraq this year to date. Updated monthly.




0
NGO ABDUCTIONS
PER MONTH
Jan to Oct 2018
Total NGO abductions per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.


NATIONALITY
Jan to Oct 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff abductions. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.

0
NO DATA
ALERTS SENT
104
REPORTS SENT
478
NGO ROUNDTABLES HOSTED
43
ORIENTATION BRIEFINGS
10
INSO NGO Service Register: Jan to Oct 2018

Key Risks & Mitigation Measures

Risk

Travel: Long distance travel plays an important role in NGO operations. However, road conditions, traffic patterns and safety as well as security incidents may increase risk to NGO personnel. Also, local travel, by foot or by vehicles such as taxis, may increase exposure of personnel to harassment.

Risk

Collateral risk: In specific areas of central Iraq, collateral risk from both personal and organised conflict poses a threat to NGO personnel. The security environment varies widely throughout Iraq with large areas of central and southern Iraq experiencing dynamic conflict and consistent insecurity. However, areas of the Kurdish Region of Iraq also contain territories that experience localised and organised conflict.

Risk

Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming among local actors: General issues of cultural sensitivity can frequently become an issue in areas where NGOs operate, particularly in humanitarian hubs with high concentrations of organisations.

Mitigation

Properly trained English speaking drivers are highly advised. Maintaining up-to-date information on road conditions, locations of legitimate checkpoints and security incidents on or near routes is essential for safe travel. For both long distance and local travel, having a staff driver is highly recommended. For those that do not have access to a dedicated staff driver, it is advisable to travel in groups of 2 or more people if using a taxi and to identify and use a trusted driver. Avoid using taxis or travelling by foot during later hours.

Mitigation

As a precautionary measure, in these specific areas, humanitarian organisations are advised to consider government and security facilities, vehicles exhibiting heightened security measures, religious establishments, and large events to have potential as high value targets. Humanitarian organisations should plan their movements accordingly to reduce exposure to such locations.

Mitigation

Whilst seemingly obvious, perceptions of NGOs must be constantly ascertained and actively managed. Consistent outreach to local actors and community leaders is essential in order to to develop effective relationships and mitigate against potential grievances felt within the local community.

Risk

Travel: Long distance travel plays an important role in NGO operations. However, road conditions, traffic patterns and safety as well as security incidents may increase risk to NGO personnel. Also, local travel, by foot or by vehicles such as taxis, may increase exposure of personnel to harassment.

Mitigation

Properly trained English speaking drivers are highly advised. Maintaining up-to-date information on road conditions, locations of legitimate checkpoints and security incidents on or near routes is essential for safe travel. For both long distance and local travel, having a staff driver is highly recommended. For those that do not have access to a dedicated staff driver, it is advisable to travel in groups of 2 or more people if using a taxi and to identify and use a trusted driver. Avoid using taxis or travelling by foot during later hours.


Risk

Collateral risk: In specific areas of central Iraq, collateral risk from both personal and organised conflict poses a threat to NGO personnel. The security environment varies widely throughout Iraq with large areas of central and southern Iraq experiencing dynamic conflict and consistent insecurity. However, areas of the Kurdish Region of Iraq also contain territories that experience localised and organised conflict.

Mitigation

As a precautionary measure, in these specific areas, humanitarian organisations are advised to consider government and security facilities, vehicles exhibiting heightened security measures, religious establishments, and large events to have potential as high value targets. Humanitarian organisations should plan their movements accordingly to reduce exposure to such locations.


Risk

Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming among local actors: General issues of cultural sensitivity can frequently become an issue in areas where NGOs operate, particularly in humanitarian hubs with high concentrations of organisations.

Mitigation

Whilst seemingly obvious, perceptions of NGOs must be constantly ascertained and actively managed. Consistent outreach to local actors and community leaders is essential in order to to develop effective relationships and mitigate against potential grievances felt within the local community.