Cameroon

Context analysis

The security context in Extreme-Nord Cameroon is highly unstable as the two Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), continue to conduct attacks against Security Forces (SF) and civilian populations across the borders with the neighboring Nigeria, mostly focused on the departments of Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga and Logone-et-Chari, while holding significant presence in the lake Chad area, Waza park and the Mandara hills. The ongoing conflict that started in Nigeria in 2009 between AOGs and SF quickly spilled over into Cameroon, firstly in the form of abductions of foreigners and, since 2014-2015, through the full expansion of the AOG activities over the Extreme-Nord region. Although the number of Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIEDs) has significantly decreased since the beginning of 2018, AOGs continue to conduct raids against civilians, while clashes between SF and AOGs remain frequent. NGOs operating in the Extreme-Nord are expected to continue facing strong challenges in terms of access and security during the upcoming period.

OPERATIONAL SINCE
2018

INSO FACTS & FIGURES

STAFF
NGO
MEMBERS
3.3 M
PEOPLE IN NEED
(OCHA)

Gross Incident Rate

Jan to Dec 2018

The Gross Incident Rate (GIR) consists of all security incidents recorded and reported by INSO in this country for the stated period with no disaggregation or exclusion. It includes conflict and criminal related incidents; serious (i.e. bombings) and non-serious events (i.e. demonstrations); and both security improving (i.e. arrests/seizures) and security-deteriorating incidents (i.e. attacks). The Gross Incident Rate is valuable in providing a snapshot of the overall level of volatility in the country.  It is not valuable in assessing the specific risk to NGOs and/or whether a situation is becoming better or worse as changes in the GIR may be caused by both positive (more arrests) or negative (more attacks) trends.
TOTAL
Jan to Dec 2018
Total incidents recorded in Cameroon this year to date. Updated monthly.



294
INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Dec 2018
Total incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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AUTHOR
Jan to Dec 2018
Percentage of incidents by author*
(conflict / criminal). Updated monthly.


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NGO INCIDENT Rate

Jan to Dec 2018

The NGO Incident Rate (NIR) comprises a gross count of all incidents that involved an NGO in this country for the stated time period. It includes both criminal and conflict related events; serious (i.e. killings/abductions) and non-serious (i.e. threats, petty robbery) incidents; and occurrences of both direct, indirect and/or accidental/collateral involvement. The NIR is valuable in evaluating NGO general exposure to ambient insecurity in this country and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where the NIR shows no clear pattern over time, specific NGO targeting is assumed not to be present however it is important to remember that rate changes are also affected by per-capita density and NGO mobility. Neither INSO nor any other entity we are aware of has meaningful data on these two components, meaning that numbers should be taken as gross indicators only.
TOTAL
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO incidents in Cameroon this year to date. Updated monthly.

1
NGO INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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TYPE
Jan to Dec 2018
Percentage of incidents by type* (SAF, IED, intimidation etc). Updated monthly.


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NGO Fatality Rate

Jan to Dec 2018

The NGO Fatality Rate (NFR) comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been killed or died in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross organisations only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both criminal and conflict related causes; targeted and accidental deaths and all types of weapons/tactics. The NGO Fatality Rate works with the NIR and is valuable in determining the likelihood of this most serious result and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where there is no clear upwards trend in NGO deaths, we assess that systematic targeting of NGOs does not exist and that deaths rather occur as a result of exposure to ambient insecurity albeit with occasional targeted events.
TOTAL
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO fatalities in Cameroon this year to date. Updated monthly.
0
NGO FATALITIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO fatalities per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Dec 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff fatalities. Updated monthly.


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0
NO DATA

NGO Injury Rate

Jan to Dec 2018

The NGO Injury Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been injured in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both accidental and deliberate causes. In the case where an individual subsequently dies from their injuries, they have been removed from this count and added to the NFR.
Total
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO injuries in Cameroon this year to date. Updated monthly.
0
NGO INJURIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO injuries per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Dec 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff injuries. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.

0
NO DATA

NGO Abduction Rate

Jan to Dec 2018

The NGO Abduction Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been abducted in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. For this purpose "abduction" includes all cases of NGO workers being taken against their will and unlawfully for any purpose and for any duration. Some abductions turn in to kidnapping (where political or criminal demands are made) and some in to detentions (where the victim is released without demand).
Total
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO abductions in Cameroon this year to date. Updated monthly.



0
NGO ABDUCTIONS
PER MONTH
Jan to Dec 2018
Total NGO abductions per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact numbers.

NATIONALITY
Jan to Dec 2018
Percentage of national and international NGO staff abductions. Updated monthly.


Roll mouse over chart for exact percentages.

0
NO DATA
ALERTS SENT
REPORTS SENT
NGO ROUNDTABLES HOSTED
CONDUCTED TRAININGS
INSO NGO Service Register: Jan to Dec 2018

Key Risks & Mitigation Measures

Risk

Collateral exposure to AOG attacks. The AOG presence in the area generates an increased risk of predatory attacks against civilian populations, or of clashes between these groups and Security Forces. Indeed, the use of these border areas by various AOG factions for resupply purposes results in a sustained pace of attacks against villages and lootings, while clashes between AOG and Cameroonian Security Forces are frequently reported. As a result, humanitarian workers can be exposed to possible collateral damages and face strong challenges in terms of activities implementation.

Risk

Misperceptions of NGO programming among local actors. Local dynamics in areas where government control is challenged or limited are often unpredictable. The volatility of allegiances and the existence of a criminal-AOG nexus can create conflicts between local communities. As a result, humanitarian workers can be perceived as taking side through the selection or targeting of beneficiaries and the implementation of activities. The complexity and unpredictability of this operating context as well as the presence of armed actors or elements represent a strong risk for NGOs.

Risk

Kidnapping. Threats of humanitarian workers kidnapping have been reported in the Extreme-Nord of Cameroon during the last months, while kidnappings or abductions of foreigners were already reported in the area during the past years. The expansion of the AOG activities and the presence of various factions as well as the increased threats of kidnappings reported in neighboring Nigeria generate a heightened level of risk for NGO workers.

Mitigation

Ensure situational awareness and monitoring (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements. Avoid close proximity with parties to the conflict, notably Security Forces (i.e. armed escorts, collocation in military facilities). NGOs should also ensure staff have followed personal security training and have a medevac plan in place.

Mitigation

Monitor local dynamics before program implementation and ensure that aid delivery is done in a conflict sensitive manner, with prior consideration of local socio-economical equilibriums and as per the “do no harm” principle. Monitor and ensure awareness of NGOs and activities perception and acceptance by local populations and stakeholders.

Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). NGOs should also employ strong community acceptance strategies, make sure compounds are secure, control staff movement, implement low-profile strategies when and where needed (i.e. keep a low profile when in transit, or implement staff profiling strategies in the most at-risk areas).

Risk

Collateral exposure to AOG attacks. The AOG presence in the area generates an increased risk of predatory attacks against civilian populations, or of clashes between these groups and Security Forces. Indeed, the use of these border areas by various AOG factions for resupply purposes results in a sustained pace of attacks against villages and lootings, while clashes between AOG and Cameroonian Security Forces are frequently reported. As a result, humanitarian workers can be exposed to possible collateral damages and face strong challenges in terms of activities implementation.

Mitigation

Ensure situational awareness and monitoring (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). Establish clear movement tracking and monitoring procedures for field movements. Avoid close proximity with parties to the conflict, notably Security Forces (i.e. armed escorts, collocation in military facilities). NGOs should also ensure staff have followed personal security training and have a medevac plan in place.


Risk

Misperceptions of NGO programming among local actors. Local dynamics in areas where government control is challenged or limited are often unpredictable. The volatility of allegiances and the existence of a criminal-AOG nexus can create conflicts between local communities. As a result, humanitarian workers can be perceived as taking side through the selection or targeting of beneficiaries and the implementation of activities. The complexity and unpredictability of this operating context as well as the presence of armed actors or elements represent a strong risk for NGOs.

Mitigation

Monitor local dynamics before program implementation and ensure that aid delivery is done in a conflict sensitive manner, with prior consideration of local socio-economical equilibriums and as per the “do no harm” principle. Monitor and ensure awareness of NGOs and activities perception and acceptance by local populations and stakeholders.


Risk

Kidnapping. Threats of humanitarian workers kidnapping have been reported in the Extreme-Nord of Cameroon during the last months, while kidnappings or abductions of foreigners were already reported in the area during the past years. The expansion of the AOG activities and the presence of various factions as well as the increased threats of kidnappings reported in neighboring Nigeria generate a heightened level of risk for NGO workers.

Mitigation

Situational awareness is key (i.e. mapping of hot zones, most likely timing of attacks). NGOs should also employ strong community acceptance strategies, make sure compounds are secure, control staff movement, implement low-profile strategies when and where needed (i.e. keep a low profile when in transit, or implement staff profiling strategies in the most at-risk areas).