Mali

Context analysis

The Sahel is experiencing a serious security and humanitarian crisis and the situation is particularly volatile in Mali. In early 2012, AOG with different political agendas pushed the Malian forces southwards. Military turmoil resulted in a political coup in Bamako in March 2012, while in the North radical AOG rejected independent/autonomous AOG outside main cities. By January 2013, a French led counter-insurgency operation had caused AOG to abandon their new positions and MINUSMA was established in April 2013. While largely credible July 2013 elections went some way towards easing political tensions, the country faces major challenges in overcoming the rifts of the coup, settling a lasting peace with the separatists and combating a resurgent transnational guerilla force. For the last months, pro-government AOG and autonomous AOG occupied the northern part of the country and continued fighting while engaged in a peace process lead by Algiers, which was finally signed in June 2015. Implementation of the peace agreement is now a big challenge, as previous attempts in the last 50 years have failed. In the meantime, radical AOG are still present and expand their attacks southwards to areas so far spared from the conflict. In this very volatile situation, NGOs have difficulty in accessing vulnerable populations and require reliable information about security and context.

OPERATIONAL SINCE
2013

INSO FACTS & FIGURES

30+
STAFF
133
NGO
MEMBERS
3.7 M
People In Need
(OCHA)

Gross Incident Rate

Jan to Feb 2017

The Gross Incident Rate (GIR) consists of all security incidents recorded and reported by INSO in this country for the stated period with no disaggregation or exclusion. It includes conflict and criminal related incidents; serious (i.e. bombings) and non-serious events (i.e. demonstrations); and both security improving (i.e. arrests/seizures) and security-deteriorating incidents (i.e. attacks). The Gross Incident Rate is valuable in providing a snapshot of the overall level of volatility in the country.  It is not valuable in assessing the specific risk to NGOs and/or whether a situation is becoming better or worse as changes in the GIR may be caused by both positive (more arrests) or negative (more attacks) trends.
Total
Jan to Feb 2017
Total incidents recorded in Mali this year to date. Updated monthly.

395
INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Feb 2017
Total incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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AUTHOR
Jan to Feb 2017
Percentage of incidents by author*
(conflict / criminal). Updated monthly.


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NGO INCIDENT Rate

Jan to Feb 2017

The NGO Incident Rate (NIR) comprises a gross count of all incidents that involved an NGO in this country for the stated time period. It includes both criminal and conflict related events; serious (i.e. killings/abductions) and non-serious (i.e. threats, petty robbery) incidents; and occurrences of both direct, indirect and/or accidental/collateral involvement. The NIR is valuable in evaluating NGO general exposure to ambient insecurity in this country and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where the NIR shows no clear pattern over time, specific NGO targeting is assumed not to be present however it is important to remember that rate changes are also affected by per-capita density and NGO mobility. Neither INSO nor any other entity we are aware of has meaningful data on these two components, meaning that numbers should be taken as gross indicators only.  

Total
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO incidents in Mali this year to date. Updated monthly. 




23
NGO INCIDENTS
PER MONTH
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO incidents per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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Type
Jan to Feb 2017
Percentage of incidents by type* (SAF, IED, intimidation etc). Updated monthly.


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NGO Fatality Rate

Jan to Feb 2017

The NGO Fatality Rate (NFR) comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been killed or died in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross organisations only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both criminal and conflict related causes; targeted and accidental deaths and all types of weapons/tactics. The NGO Fatality Rate works with the NIR and is valuable in determining the likelihood of this most serious result and whether there is a negative or positive directional trend over time. Where there is no clear upwards trend in NGO deaths, we assess that systematic targeting of NGOs does not exist and that deaths rather occur as a result of exposure to ambient insecurity albeit with occasional targeted events.

Total
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO fatalities in Mali this year to date. Updated monthly.

1
NGO FATALITIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO fatalities per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Feb 2017
Percentage of national and international NGO staff fatalities. Updated monthly.


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NGO Injury Rate

Jan to Feb 2017

The NGO Injury Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been injured in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. The count includes both accidental and deliberate causes. In the case where an individual subsequently dies from their injuries, they have been removed from this count and added to the NFR.
Total
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO injuries in Mali this year to date. Updated monthly.




0
NGO INJURIES
PER MONTH
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO injuries per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.


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NATIONALITY
Jan to Feb 2017
Percentage of national and international NGO staff injuries. Updated monthly.


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0
NO DATA

NGO Abduction Rate

Jan to Feb 2017

The NGO Abduction Rate comprises a total count of all NGO workers that have been abducted in this country for the stated period. The count includes the national and international staff of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement only and does not include the staff of the United Nations unless otherwise stated. For this purpose "abduction" includes all cases of NGO workers being taken against their will and unlawfully for any purpose and for any duration. Some abductions turn in to kidnapping (where political or criminal demands are made) and some in to detentions (where the victim is released without demand).
Total
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO abductions in Mali this year to date. Updated monthly.




0
NGO ABDUCTIONS
PER MONTH
Jan to Feb 2017
Total NGO abductions per month for the current year to date. Updated monthly.

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NATIONALITY
Jan to Feb 2017
Percentage of national and international NGO staff abductions. Updated monthly.

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0
NO DATA
ALERTS SENT
14
REPORTS SENT
66
NGO ROUNDTABLES HOSTED
35
NEW STAFF ORIENTATIONS
2
INSO NGO Service Register: Jan to Feb 2017

Key Risks & Mitigation Measures

Risk

Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and carjacking have increased. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements.

Risk

Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and the local security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against MINUSMA).

Risk

Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players.

Mitigation

Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence.

Mitigation

Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Closely monitor and assess local security environments.

Mitigation

NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming.

Risk

Criminality and carjacking: Armed robberies and carjacking have increased. Insecurity on the roads is common. NGO incidents have been coincidental as well as a result of direct targeting and displaying or explaining NGO status is not a deterrent when dealing with irregular armed elements.

Mitigation

Stay up to date on road security conditions, travel in ad hoc convoys, use alternate transport means where possible (e.g. by river). Brief all staff members to be aware of how to react during a robbery or any other security incident in order to avoid aggression and violence.


Risk

Collateral exposure to fighting between armed groups: Fighting between AOG and the local security forces is common and NGOs are at risk of collateral exposure to attacks on another intended target (i.e. mine explosion or suicide attack against MINUSMA).

Mitigation

Avoid proximity to conflict actors, also while travelling. Closely monitor and assess local security environments.


Risk

Misperceptions or negative perceptions of NGO programming amongst local actors and intimidation from AOG: Pursuing a neutral position is a challenge in such a changing environment with highly militarised players.

Mitigation

NGOs must maintain awareness of how they are preceived in the areas where they work, live and travel and actively communicate to local stakeholders, including armed groups, about the neutral and independent nature of their programming.